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undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

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officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity of the Western world.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

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177 railways, regarded as strategic, did not become the highways of international commerce, and permits to travel were notoriously difficult to obtain. During the first part of World War I the seclusion became even more rigorous; the government first used the country as a convenient prison-house for Austro-Hungarians captured on the front in Europe, and later became involved in the bloody suppression of a bitter rebellion leading to famine and pestilence on a vast scale. It took the two revolutions of 1917 to raise the curtain high enough to reveal to the outside world a confused scene fitfully illumined by the torches of many factions, each struggling against a dark background of terror to plant its own light on the ramparts and herald a new dawn. A brief glimpse only, and the curtain fell again.

It is the Soviet habit to allude angrily to the years 1918 to 1920 as the Period of Intervention, meaning it to be inferred that the chaos of these years of transition was brought about by British machiavellian intrigue in a colonial sphere which should have concerned the Russians only. That period in due course I shall consider: here it is enough to say that the limit of British penetration into Turkistan reached no farther than Merv, while the time was far too short to afford any real insight into, much less any control over, the forces then
● 114 striving for mastery in Russia's Asiatic Empire. It is rather to the men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a period of intense struggle, during which they themselves for a short time figured as founders or upholders of independent national States. These are they who not only knew the inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern. The fact that this fresh inspiration was quickly followed by the bitterest disillusion over the failure of Bolshevik practice to live up to early promises, does not mean that the positive

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reality of the one is necessarily to be measured by the negations of the other. The new thought had come to stay. But at that time events were too strong for native reformers who were unable to turn their opportunities to lasting account. Fortunately some of those men have left memorials in writing, most revealing of their earlier hopes and endurances, and suggestive of what their peoples may yet achieve, should history once more turn in their favour. Among these are Mustafa Chokai and Zeki Velidi Togan (known to the Russians as Chokaiev and Velidov), leaders of the Eastern Turks during the interregnum period, who, first in attempted understanding with the Soviets, and later in conflict with them, strove to win political freedom for the peoples of Turkistan.

For a short time in 1917–18 Chokai presided over an independent government at Kokand in the Farghana Valley, now part of Uzbekistan. In the period between the Wars he wrote and lectured effectively in Western Europe, and was the author of a short book in Russian [1] describing his country's reactions to Soviet domination. I shall return to the story of his death in Germany in 1941: here it need be said only that he is less likely to be remembered for his writings than for having founded and inspired a national operation which later in World War II in other hands attained a considerable momentum.

Togan is that rare product, the professional historian who has been able to record a series of dramatic events in which he had his own, not negligible, part. Not directly from Turkistan himself but a Bashkir (in Turkish, Bashkurd), he came first to prominence as the mainstay of the short-lived republic of Little Bashkiria in the Urals. In the early years of the Revolution he was admitted to the confidences of the high priests of Soviet colonialism, Lenin and Stalin. Turning from them in disillusion in 1920, he spent the next three years behind the scenes in and around Bukhara in an attempt to organize resistance to the re-establishment of Russian rule in its Soviet guise. During that time he saw much of Enver Pasha. After

[1] Bib. III, 9.

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● 114 Enver's death he withdrew to Afghanistan to find his way ultimately to Turkey, where, after some vicissitudes, he attained academic distinction as a professor at the Istanbul University. There he now is. In 1929 he published in modern (Western) Turkish his story of the Eastern Turks,[1] entitled *Bugünkü Türkili*, or *Turkistan today*, adding a fascicule in 1940.

This work is a serious history of the peoples of Turkish stock east of the Caspian, written by a Central Asian Turk with a wide historical sweep and with practical experience gained in the service of these people. It contains long-term reflections based on a study of the traditions of a land little known to Western historians, reflections from the mind of a scholar in Turkic comparative history and literatures. Of the cause and inspirations of the struggles of that time the author has much that is new to relate. His story ranges from intimate discussions with Lenin and Stalin themselves to the epic of Enver Pasha, and from the tribal organizations of the Eastern Turks to the programme of social democratic reform which, like the Young Turks a decade earlier in Istanbul, he and coadjutors drew up for their compatriots. And through it all there runs a flame of ardent patriotism, a spirit that moves upon the waters. The question he poses is whether there are those remaining who can still hear that voice and respond to that spirit. Many of those who might have heard have been crushed beneath the heel of an iron tyranny.

I had thought originally that Togan's book might be brought to English readers by means of a simple translation. But the book is a formidable one, and much of it deals with details of old tradition and tribal organization which would have no meaning for the general reader. Moreover, one of its merits as a scholarly thesis is a certain diffuseness, which, however valuable to the Turkish student, would fail to attract the outside reader, interested in the background and prospects of an almost legendary land. Its message can best be brought to the West by means of a new interpretation, using the

[1] *Bugünkü Türkili* (Istanbul, 1942–7). *Türkili* (Turkic word *il* = tribe or country) is the equivalent of the Persian *Turkistan*.

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author's ideas but compressing and sorting them out and, where necessary, relating them to other material. Such a treatment involves a number of changes of presentation and emphasis, which may not represent the views of the original. Yet, just as this treatment enables the interpreter to be more objective, it also gives him the right to be generous in reference to his source. On balance, for readers outside Turkey, the gain may outweigh the loss.

Other guides indeed there are. Some of these are refugees, both of the older emigration who fled the land shortly after the establishment of Soviet rule, and of younger groups whom the conditions of World War II enabled to escape the prison-house. Their names will appear as the story unfolds. There are, too, fitful gleams from behind the curtain. The most rigid frontier defences cannot prevent news filtering through to neighbouring countries whose affinities beget a natural sympathy, welcoming a steady stream of refugees. All these have light to shed. Sometimes too an even brighter illumination proceeds from the statements and admissions of the Kremlin, and particularly of Stalin himself. There is also Soviet publicity, always so sedulous to replace the old with new that it gives prominence to the old things which it would uproot. From time to time informed men [1] from the West have seized an unexpected chance to traverse Turkistan and been able to record what they have understood. But it still remains for someone to gather up the old with the new, and strike a balance which shall determine how far the process of continental assimilation has gone, and to what degree it has altered out of recognition an identity which was the child of a Turco-Iranian history of over one thousand years. In terms of ultimate ideologies, the question is one of the faith which shall prevail in the end, Communism or Islam; or, perhaps more subtly, there is need of a forecast of the several positions, gradations or compromises which may be expected to result from the interaction of the two extremes.

A word of caution will not be amiss. The refugees' books

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 5, 40 and 65 — Bailey, Goldman, Fitzroy Maclean.

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• 114 are patriots' visions of the land and peoples of their origin and their dreams, seen by them as suffering under a yoke cruel and intolerable. A writer approaching his subject in this spirit will underrate the material progress and prosperity attained under the foreign dominion, setting the profits low in the scale against the loss of freedom. He is likely to belittle the material achievement of the Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet. Nor will he adequately appraise the work of the many Russian scholars and historians of distinction who have made the study of Central Asian peoples and problems a field peculiarly their own. An attempt has here been made to correct this perspective. But, where Togan or others are cited, the reader should remember that a seer does not rate at their worldly value the achievements, or even the power, of the kings whom he denounces. He counts on greater than worldly values. Other nations, resting on their prophets, have preserved a tradition, spiritual and political, against all oppressions. Then why not the Eastern Turks?

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deserts. And this without doubt is the predisposing cause of the migrations over Central Asia from the dawn of history.

The history of what I have called the Turanian basin up to the time of the Russian conquest is extraordinarily confusing. Even the Russian orientalist, V. V. Barthold, who made this field peculiarly his own, was driven to exclaim: 'L'historien qui cherche à l'expliquer se trouve fort embarrassé de distinguer entre les causes et les effets'.[1] It is indeed a pitfall for the unwary, even for one who has spent many months in the country itself. An instance of this is to be found in the heroic journey of the Hungarian Vambéry, who penetrated to Transoxiana in 1863 in the guise of a dervish. When, after his return, he published, among other works, a *History of Bokhara* without adequate knowledge of the labours of Russian scholars in this field, he was mercilessly assailed by a company of *critici furiosi*, among others the Russian orientalist Grigoriev. That the criticism was influenced by professional and national jealousies is indicated by the verdicts of Curzon and the American diplomat Schuyler, the former speaking of the profound sensation caused by Vambéry's voyage and works, and the latter confessing to having indulged in harsh criticism. But Vambéry had in the end to admit that his local knowledge did not equip him to pose as an historian. Like Burton, he was a traveller first.

An immense amount of learning and research has gone into these subjects from the Russian side, both in Tsarist and in Soviet times. The names of Radloff, Barthold and Samoylovich are particularly remarkable in the Central Asian field.[2] Yet it remains true that a popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist. What follows cannot claim to be more than an essay in history: the most that can be done within the narrow limits of a contemporary book is to sketch in historical background enough to enable any who now approach these peoples and problems for the first time to understand something of the forces that have

[1] Bib. I, 7, p. 189.

[2] The reader is referred to the Bibliography at the end of this book.

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any authority offering them protection against the indigenous population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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